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1. Introduction 
In 1992 over 150 states signed the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UN-FCCC), which objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The quantification of emission limits, reduction objectives and 
policies to meet these objectives were settled in Kyoto. This resulted in the 
adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Under the Protocol the 
European Union (EU) committed itself to reducing the emissions of 6 greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) by 8 percent during the period 2008-2012, in comparison with the 
levels in 1990. It was agreed that the EU could redistribute its assigned GHG 
reduction target among the member states as long as the outcome amounted to an 
overall reduction of at least 8 percent. The problem of how the burden of climate 
policy should be allocated across countries is one of the most challenging issues in 
climate negotiations and will largely determine the allocation of abatement costs. 
The Climate Convention gave no clear guidelines on how to redistribute, but 
emphasized the importance of equity and efficiency.
1 Article 3.1 says that parties 
should protect the climate system on the basis of equity. Equity is not defined, 
however according to Article 4.2a: “differences in parties starting points and 
approaches, economic structures and resource bases, need to maintain strong and 
sustainable economic growth, available technologies, and other individual 
circumstances, as well as the need for equitable contributions” should be taken into 
account in the settlement of reduction targets. Furthermore, Article 3.3 states that 
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective to ensure 
global benefits at the lowest possible cost. Which national circumstances that 
should be considered to promote ‘equity’ and how, were discussed in the country 
negotiations that preceded the settlement.  
Several comprehensive approaches have been launched to address the issue of 
differentiation of mitigation commitments, among those are; multi-stage, per capita 
convergence, Triptych, and multi-sector convergence.
2 The results of the Triptych 
study (Phylipsen et al., 1998), commissioned by the Dutch Presidency of the EU, 
                                                 
1 Unlike efficiency, no universal consensus exists on the best definition of equity. Key principles of 
equity in international climate negotiations have been defined by, for example, Ringius et al. 
(2002) and Rose et al. (1998). In this paper, equity refers to distributional justice of the European 
redistribution of the 8 percent GHG reduction target. 
2 For an explanation of these approaches, see Sijm et al. (2001).  3
served as an advisory document and was claimed to influence the final agreement 
for EU (Blok et al., 1997; Ringius, 1997; Barker et al., 2001). The Triptych study 
suggests that emissions are ‘equitably’ redistributed among the member states if 
national circumstances such as population size and growth, standard of living, 
economic structure, energy efficiency in power generation, and climate are taken 
into account. How to actually redistribute was agreed in 1998, and is referred to as 
the  Burden-Sharing Agreement (BSA) (e.g., The Commission of the European 
Communities, 2000). This agreement lays down differentiated emission limits for 
each Member State with the aim to ensuring that the EU meets its overall 8 percent 
reduction commitment under the Protocol. Limits are expressed in terms of 
percentages by which Member States must reduce, or in some cases may hold or 
increase, their emissions compared with the base year level (1990). The BSA was 
reaffirmed by joint ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on May 31 2002, where it 
became binding international law. The individual states’ shares of EU emissions 
and the BSA figures are given in Table 1. 
Since efficiency and equity often are conflicting criteria, the purpose of this 
paper is to analyze which aspects finally influenced the settlement of the BSA. The 
equity hypotheses tested refer to whether the national circumstances pointed out by 
the Triptych study influenced the BSA. In particular, if poorer member states were 
given a lighter environmental burden. The efficiency criterion focuses on the cost-
effectiveness of the allocation of abatement resources between the EU Member 
States. Specifically, the hypothesis tested is whether higher marginal abatement 
costs (MACs) of GHGs contributed to lighter emission requirements, and vice 
versa. As a first step, MACs of GHGs are estimated for each EU Member State, 
using aggregate production data for the period 1990-2000. A shadow pricing model 
originating from Färe et al. (2002, 2005) will be used. The model is founded on 
production theory where the technology is represented by the directional output 
distance function, from which the MACs are derived. To test the cost-efficiency and 
equity hypotheses, the BSA emission changes are regressed on the estimated MACs 
together with variables capturing differences in national circumstances, suggested 
by the Climate Convention and the Triptych study. 
Many economic analyses, following the adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol, have 
focused on analyzing the market for GHGs emission trading. The main conclusion 
of these studies is that trading improves cost-efficiency, lowering the cost of  4
implementing the Protocol.
3 Overviews of such studies are provided in the IPCC 
Third Assessment Report of Working Group III “Mitigation” by Metz et al. (2001), 
and in the special issue of the Energy Journal, edited by Weyant and Hill (1999). 
Even if the permit allocation does not affect cost efficiency, it can be interpreted as 
a lump sum redistribution instrument to pursue equity objectives. Equity and 
efficiency issues have been analyzed focusing on the distribution of carbon dioxide 
tradable emission permits (see e.g., Larsen and Shah, 1994; Nilsson, 2004; Rose et 
al., 1998; Shiell, 2003). 
At least in the first trading period 2005 to 2007 of the European Union GHG 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), only carbon dioxide emission intensive 
industries will be involved in the trade. In order to reach the BSA countries need to 
adopt other measures to control emissions in sectors not covered by the EU ETS. 
Given the large sums that have to be spent on abatement, it is important that the 
overall reductions made are cost efficient. An analysis of the BSA will reveal if the 
European reduction of GHGs is cost efficient and equitable. To our knowledge, 
only few analyses question the BSA; a welfare analysis by Böhringer et al. (2002) 
translates the BSA into welfare impacts using a static computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the EU. These impacts are composed of substitution 
effects and cross-country income effects triggered by the imposition of carbon 
emission constraints. Their results indicate that the BSA does not result in an 
equitable outcome in welfare terms. In a similar analysis by Eyckmans et al. (2002) 
a welfare analysis is made using a CGE model for Europe. To visualize the 
efficiency-equity trade-off, implicit welfare weights are calculated making the BSA 
a welfare optimum for the EU. The conclusion drawn from their simulations is that 
even if richer member states have been assigned relatively high abatement efforts 
and poorer ones are allowed to emit more, this differentiation does not go far 
enough.
4 Babiker et al. (2003) analyze to what extent the welfare costs associated 
with the BSA implementation depend on sectoral allocation of emission rights. 
They find that equalizing MACs across sectors greatly reduces the burden but that 
                                                 
3 In a competitive permit market profit maximizing incentives will make pollutants undertake 
abatement measures until the marginal cost of the last ton avoided equals the market price of the 
pollution permits. 
4 A disadvantage with both these analyses is that they have to make projections on future economic 
development, in particular energy efficiency improvements. These projections will drive their 
results and if not accurate will be a source of error for the analysis.  5
pre-existing tax distortions can make other allocations preferable. In addition, 
Viguier et al. (2003) quantify the economic impacts of the Kyoto commitment 
when each EU member state individually meets a CO2 emission target.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical framework for 
computing MACs is provided. Section 3 gives the empirical model. First, the 
directional output distance functional form and the techniques to estimate this form 
is provided. Then, a model for analyzing the BSA is suggested. In Section 4 the 
data are described, and in Section 5 the empirical results are given. Finally, Section 
6 offers summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1.  The directional output distance function 
To calculate MACs of undesirable outputs a shadow-pricing model originating 
from Färe et al. (2002, 2005) will be used.
5 It bases on the directional ouput 
distance function which is used to characterize the production technology. The 
distance function is a measure of technical efficiency in production. The technical 
efficiency rate indicates how efficient resources are used.  
Formally, let 
M
M y y y + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J b b b + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  be vectors of good 
and undesirable outputs, respectively, and let 
N
N x x x + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  be a vector of 
inputs. The technology of reference is the output possibilities set,  ) (x P , which for a 
given vector of inputs denotes all technically feasible output vectors. This output set 
is assumed to be convex and compact with  } 0 , 0 { ) 0 ( = P . Furthermore, inputs and 
good outputs are assumed to be freely disposable and undesirable outputs only 
weakly disposable. Finally, good outputs are assumed to be null-joint with the 
undesirable outputs. This means that good outputs cannot be produced without 
producing undesirable outputs. The directional output distance function is defined 
on the output possibilities set,  ) (x P , as 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Marklund (2003) provides an application of this model to the Swedish pulp industry, together with 
a thorough overview of the development of the estimation of undesirable output shadow prices.  6
() ( ) ( ) { } x P g b g y g b y x D b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ + = β β β
β , : max ; , ,  (1) 
 
which then inherits its properties from  ) (x P . The solution, 
∗ β , gives the maximum 
expansion and contraction of good outputs and undesirable outputs, respectively. 
The vector  ) , ( b y g g g − =  specifies in which direction an output vector, 
) ( ) , ( x P b y ∈ , is scaled so as to reach the boundary of the output set at 
) ( ) , ( x P g b g y b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ +
∗ ∗ β β , where  ) ; , , ( g b y x D =
∗ β . This means that the 
producer becomes more technically efficient when simultaneously increasing good 
outputs and decreasing undesirable outputs. The distance function takes the value of 
zero for technically efficient output vectors on the boundary of  ) (x P , whereas 
positive values apply to inefficient output vectors below the boundary. The higher 
the value the more inefficient is the output vector. Finally, the directional output 
distance function satisfies the translation property 
 
( ) ( ) α α α − = ⋅ − ⋅ + g b y x D g g b g y x D b y ; , , ; , ,  (2) 
 
where  α  is a positive scalar. It is the additive analogue of the multiplicative 
homogeneity property of the Shephard output distance function (Färe et al., 2005).
6 
 
2.2.  The shadow-pricing model 
When deriving the output shadow-pricing model from the directional output 
distance function, the duality between the distance function and the revenue 
function is exploited. Let 
M
M p p p + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J q q q + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  represent 
absolute prices of good and undesirable outputs, respectively. Färe et al. (2005) 
showed that relative shadow prices of undesirable outputs, in terms of the m:th 
good output, can be calculated from  
 
                                                 
6 The translation property states that if good output is expanded by αgy and bad output is contracted 
by αgb, then the value of the distance function will be more efficient with the amount α.  7
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This is the marginal rate of transformation between the  th j :  undesirable output 
and the  th m:  good output, MRTjm, and where  0 ) ( < ∂ ⋅ ∂ m y D  and  0 ) ( ≥ ∂ ⋅ ∂ j b D . 
The MAC is then measured in terms of decreased production of ym, which has to be 
met when reducing bj marginally, once all technical inefficiency has been 
eliminated. 
The shadow-pricing model is illustrated in Figure 1. The output possibility set is 
given by  ) (x P  and the technically inefficient output vector  ) , ( b y  is produced. 
Given the directional vector, g = (1,-1), the directional output distance function in 
(1) scales  ) , ( b y  until it reaches the boundary of  ) (x P  at  A. This particular point 
has a supporting hyper plane interpreted as a shadow price relation, 
∗ ∗ − p q , which 
counts for  ) , ( b y , and can be calculated using the formula in (3). By definition 
nonnegative MACs of bad outputs correspond to tangents on the boundary where 
the slope is nonnegative. 
 
3. The  empirical  model 
3.1. The  directional  output distance function 
Following Färe et al. (2005), the directional output distance function is 
parameterized using a (additive) quadratic flexible functional form. In our case, 
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where  κ  and τ  are parameters representing country and time specific effects, 
respectively. The function is computed using both a linear programming technique 
(LP) and a Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) technique.
7,8 How the 
functions are computed with the different techniques is described in the Appendix. 
As in Färe et al. (2005) the directional vector g = (1,-1), where 1 refers to gy and -1 
refers to -gb, is chosen (see Figure 1). This choice of direction is consistent with 
environmental regulations, which require reduction in bad outputs.  
 
3.2. Analysing  the  BSA 
The Climate Convention emphasizes that developed countries are mainly 
responsible for historical and current emissions of GHGs, and that developing 
countries must be allowed less demanding constraints so that their social and 
development needs can be fulfilled (Phylipsen et al., 1998). Criticism against the 
BSA claims that equity has been overlooked and that the assigned emission 
reduction targets are against the Cohesion Member States, i.e., Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland, and Greece (Dessai, 1999).
9 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the 
BSA from both an equity and efficiency perspective. In order to accomplish that, 
the following regression model is suggested 
 
kt kt kt kt k W MAC BSA ν ρ ω ζ φ + + + Ζ + =  (9) 
 
where  K k ,..., 1 =  denotes the EU Member States and  T t ,..., 1 =  denotes the years. 
The dependent variable, 
k BSA , is the countries percentage reduction or increase in 
GHG emissions assigned by the Burden Sharing Agreement.
10 The vector 
kt Z  
contains variables of national circumstances that are suggested by the Climate 
Convention and recommended in the Triptych study to promote equity.
11 The 
                                                 
7 The LP estimating procedure is also adopted in Marklund (2003). 
8 For an application of COLS to the Shephard output distance function, see Lovell et al. (1994). 
9 These countries are eligible for support from the European Cohesion Fund, which aims to 
encourage greater economic and social cohesion and uniformity of living standards between 
member states. 
10 See Burden sharing in Table 1. 
11 The Triptych study covers only energy related CO2 emissions, while the BSA covers total country 
emissions of an additional 5 GHGs (methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,  9
elements of the vector Z will be described in Section 4. Furthermore, by including 
the marginal abatement cost estimate, 
kt MAC , obtained by applying the shadow-
pricing model in (3), a cost-efficiency hypothesis test is made possible. However, in 
this model the 
kt MAC  variable is a generated regressor that is stochastic and, 
therefore, not fixed in repeated samples. In order to correct for any 
heteroscedasticity that may occur, the expression in (9) is regressed as a White 
estimator, giving heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. Furthermore, vector 
kt W  contains other variables that possibly influenced the BSA, and these variables 
will also be described in Section 4. The last term on the right-hand side, v
kt, is an 
error term that is uncorrelated with all other right-hand side variables and 
uncorrelated in time and across countries. The parameters to be estimated are φ , ζ , 
ω , and ρ . As the model in (9) is specified it is assumed that the BSA, which was 
settled in 1998, is based on historical information and expectations about the 
nearest future, covering the period 1990-2000.  
 
4. Data 
The directional output distance function is estimated using aggregated annual 
data for the EU Member States provided by AMECO and Eurostat.
12 AMECO is a 
macro economic data bank available at the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs. More specifically, the countries 
included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom for the period 1990-2000. This results in an unbalanced panel of 156 
observations, since some countries lacked data for a few years. To produce the good 
output GDP,  1 y , each country is assumed to use three inputs; energy,  1 x , labor,  2 x , 
and capital,  3 x . One undesirable output,  1 b , i.e., a by-product from producing GDP, 
is modeled as a compound of 6 greenhouse gases, GHGs.
13 Energy is the country’s 
                                                                                                                                        
and sulphur hexafluoride). Emissions of these gases are to be weighted according to their 100-year 
global warming potential. 
12 Distance functions have mostly been applied to plant level data. For an example of an application 
of the Shephard output distance function to aggregated country level data, see Färe et al. (1994). 
13 These are; carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and industrial halogenated 
gases: hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).  10
final energy consumption measured in giga joule (GJ). Labor is total employment, 
measured in number of workers, and capital is the net capital stock. Both capital 
and GDP are measured in 1995 constant prices in 1000 Euro. Data on GHGs are 
total national emissions measured in tons. This is consistent with the Kyoto 
Protocol where emission allowances should be specified in number of tons of CO2-
equivalent that can be emitted. Descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs are 
provided in Tables 2 and 3. Finally, when estimating the distance function, all 
variables were transformed into per capita terms. 
To test the cost-efficiency and equity hypotheses, the BSA emission change 
variable (from Table 1) is regressed on the MAC variable, and variables 
representing national circumstances in accordance with the model in (9). The 
Climate Convention states that national circumstances should be taken into account 
in the negotiations. The Triptych study (Phylipsen et al., 1998) tried to clarify 
which variables were important and how they should be accounted for.
14 The 
suggested circumstances relevant to promote equity were; standard of living, 
economic structure, energy efficiency, fuel mix in power generation, climate, and 
population size and growth. These circumstances constitute the basis for the 
elements of the vector Z in equation (9). Standard of living is approximated with 
mean Consumption expenditure per household in 1000 Euro for the year 1994.
15 
The Climate Convention emphasizes that developed countries are mainly 
responsible for historical and current emissions and should therefore make the 
largest reductions. According to UN-FCCC Article 4.7, economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the 
developing country parties. This also applies to the EU Cohesion Member states. 
Therefore, to promote equity, countries with currently low consumption 
expenditures should be given lighter environmental burdens. 
There are differences in economic structure between countries resulting in 
differences in energy consumption and, therefore, GHG emissions. To capture such 
differences the relative size of the energy intensive manufacturing industry, 
Industry gross value added as a share of GDP, is included. Energy intense sectors 
                                                 
14 Claimed to influence the final agreement for EU (Blok et al., 1997; Ringius, 1997; Barker et al., 
2001). 
15 The Triptych study used GDP per capita, however since GDP per capita is used in our estimation 
of MACs we chose to use another proxy for standard of living.  11
will consume more energy than other sectors even if energy is used efficiently. It is, 
therefore, not necessarily fair that countries with comparatively large energy intense 
sectors would be given more stringent emission targets. Therefore, differences 
between emission reduction potential by lowering energy use should be accounted 
for when promoting equity. The extent of energy  intensity in this sector is 
approximated by the industry’s final energy consumption divided by its produced 
gross value added, measured in GJ per billions of Euro, and called Industry energy 
intensity. 
The fuel mix consumed by the country also influences the emission reductions 
potential.
16 To incorporate this particular circumstance, the variables Oil share, 
Electricity share, and Renewable share are added. They measure the share of crude 
oil and petroleum product, the share of electricity, and the share of renewable 
energy in final energy consumption, respectively. 
The different climate of the European countries results in varying 
heating/cooling needs. It has been argued that heating needs of the coldest countries 
were taken into account although the cooling needs of the warmest countries were 
foreseen (Dessai, 1999). To see if climate affected the BSA, Temperature, the 
deviation of the countries’ average temperatures from the EU average temperature, 
for the period 1961-1990, is included. The temperature data are collected from the 
data set TYN CY 1.1 in Mitchell (2003). 
Finally, the population size circumstance is accounted for by including the 
variable Population, measured in millions of inhabitants. The absolute demand for 
goods and services are largely determined by the population size, e.g., for personal 
transport, residential space heating/cooling, etc., and, therefore, results in a certain 
correlation between emissions and population size. 
In addition, a set of other variables that potentially could have influenced the 
BSA settlement was added. These variables were represented by vector W in 
equation (9). Forests can be used as carbon sinks and absorb CO2 from the 
atmosphere. To see if forest resources were taken into account, Forest land is 
included as millions of ha wooded area in 1995. Furthermore, since older cars are 
less energy efficient and have dirtier exhaust, the average age of the total number of 
                                                 
16 The Triptych study suggests the fuel mix in power generation. However, in this paper, the fuel mix 
consumed at the country level is approximated.  12
cars,  Car age, was included. Descriptive statistics for all these variables are 
provided in Table 4. 
 
5. Results 
As in Färe et al. (2005) the directional output distance function is estimated on 
mean normalized input and output data. From Section 2 we know that for the 
distance function to be well-behaved it needs to be nonnegative and the constraints 
of null-jointness, monotonicity, symmetry, and the translation property need to 
hold. These constraints are imposed in LP. In COLS the properties of 
nonnegativity, translation, and symmetry are imposed, but monotonicity and null-
jointness are tested for afterwards. The COLS estimation shows that null-jointness 
is satisfied for 119 observations (76 percent). Monotonicity in outputs is fully 
satisfied for GDP, and for 150 observations (96 percent) in the case of GHGs.
17 The 
parameters of the LP and COLS estimated distance functions are provided in Table 
5. 
Table 6 includes arithmetic averages for the mean normalized technical 
efficiency scores, CD and D, together with potential output changes.
18 For a 
hypothetical country that during 1990-2000 used the sample mean of inputs to 
produce the sample mean of outputs, the LP and COLS estimated values of the 
distance function, 0.002 and 0.004, respectively, indicate that the production is not 
technically output efficient. In the LP model the average inefficiency ranges from 
0.01 to 0.05 and for the whole sample the average is 0.02, implying that the 
countries could on average, without changing resources or developing technology, 
increase GDP with 19.08*0.02 = 0.38 thousand Euro per capita and reduce GHGs 
with 12.42 * 0.02 = 0.25 tons per capita.
19 Due to the COLS estimating procedure, 
the average inefficiency is the same for all countries and for the whole sample, i.e., 
0.06, indicating that countries could on average increase GDP with 1.14 thousand 
Euro per capita and reduce GHGs with 0.75 tons per capita.  
                                                 
17 Monotonicity in GHGs is not satisfied for 6 Luxembourg observations, resulting in negative 
MACs. For these observations the derivative w.r.t. GHGs, is set to zero, implying zero MACs. 
18 The technical efficiency scores, CD and D, in Table 6 measures the deviations from the estimated 
technological frontier.  
19 Since the distance function is estimated on mean normalized data, where the mean quantity of 
GDP is 19.08 thousand Euro per capita and GHGs is 12.42 tons per capita.  13
The GDP and GHGs quantity changes are further compared to actual quantities 
produced in each country. The COLS procedure indicates that the Cohesion 
Member States have a larger potential in percentages to increase their efficiency, 
holding input quantities and technologies fixed. For instance, Greece could increase 
GDP and decrease GHGs with 12.89 and 6.82 per cent respectively.
20  
Computed MACs for GHGs in terms of GDP, according to equation (3), are 
presented in Table 7.
21 The LP model indicates that to reduce GHG emissions with 
one ton, the hypothetical ‘at mean’ country has to reduce GDP with 510 Euro. In 
COLS the corresponding figure is 490 Euro
22, with a confidence interval of 199 – 
797 Euro/ton at the 5 percent significance level.
23 Results from other analyses 
determining MAC of carbon dioxide vary widely depending on the methodology. 
Most of them use MAC curves derived from detailed technological or 
macroeconomic models. The OECD (1998) report, presents results from different 
analyses on the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol that show large variance 
in MACs ranging from $78 to $773 for Europe.
24 Critical to the results of these 
analyses is the definition of the underlying baseline scenario
25, and the differences 
in model parameters.
26 The advantage with our setup is that no such assumptions 
have to be made. A disadvantage is that the data, due to limitations, is aggregated 
representing national MACs for the whole economy. As a consequence, the derived 
MACs are not comparable to permit prices derived from analyses only including the 
industries involved in the trade. Such analyses usually exclude household and 
transport sectors where it is expectedly comparatively more expensive to reduce 
carbon dioxide.
27 
                                                 
20 The differences in percentage efficiency in Table 6 are artefacts of different levels of GDP and 
GHG. 
21 The MAC figures refer to slopes on the estimated technological frontier.  
22 The sample averages are somewhat higher, 570 for the LP model and 670 for the COLS model. 
23 As the COLS procedure generate variance estimates, the Delta test was applied to create a 
confidence interval for the MAC estimate. The test is thoroughly described in, e.g., Greene (2002). 
24 The models and the associated MACs were: G-Cubed 167 $/ton, Poles 140 $/ton, GTEM 773 
$/ton, WorldScan 78 $/ton, GREEN 196 $/ton and AIM 214 $/ton. 
25 Scenario assumptions involving high population and GDP growth rates, a relatively clean fuel mix 
and high energy costs will lead to higher cost estimates. 
26 Especially important is the assumptions regarding the ability to substitute labor and capital for 
energy and the inter-fuel substitution elasticity. The higher these substitution possibilities are 
assumed to be, the lower the MACs (OECD, 1998). 
27 See for example Springer (2003) who gathers results from 25 models of the market for tradable 
greenhouse gas emission permits. The spectrum of prices ranges from 1 to 22 USD per ton CO2.  14
Our results reveal that MACs vary considerably between countries. For 
instance, Portugal faces a relatively high MAC and Luxembourg a relatively low 
MAC. One explanation for this could be that the functional form used is only a 
local approximation, and that countries that differ significantly from the rest may be 
assigned extreme MACs. The MACs also differ between LP and COLS, this is 
partly due to that null-jointness and monotonicity are not fulfilled for all 
observations in COLS.
28,29 
To evaluate the BSA from an efficiency-equity perspective, hypothesis tests are 
performed given the regression model in (9). The resulting estimates are provided 
in Table 8. The estimated coefficient for the MAC variable, ω, allows for a cost-
efficiency hypothesis test to determine whether the MAC served as a positive 
determinant to the GHG change targets redistributed by the BSA. The results show 
that it did, irrespective of technique used to estimate the MACs. The member states 
with higher MACs were assigned easier emission change requirements, and vice 
versa, indicating that efficiency was considered. 
For the equity hypotheses tests, a negative sign of the estimated coefficient for 
Consumption expenditure,  1 ζ , indicates that equity was considered in the BSA 
negotiations, since countries with lower standards of living were assigned easier 
emission requirements. In fact, this variable alone explains 67 percent of the 
variation in BSA. This result favours the Cohesion Member States who were 
assigned lighter environmental burdens due to low expenditures per household, and 
contradicts Dessai (1999) who claims that equity has been overlooked. The fact that 
the results indicate both efficiency and equity considerations contradicts the general 
opinion that there necessarily is an efficiency-equity trade-off. Dessai (1999) also 
claims that a so called heating degree-day correction was made to benefit northern 
countries, but a cooling correction was omitted which weighed heavily against 
southern member states and worked against equity. The Temperature coefficient, 
7 ζ , shows the contrary, that warmer countries were given easier emission 
requirements. Furthermore, the negative coefficient of Industry gross value added 
                                                 
28 A test where the LP estimating procedure is conducted without imposing these constraints reveal a 
closer confirmity of MACs between these methods (see e.g., Marklund, 2004). 
29 It is not obvious which technique to prefer. In LP it becomes fairly simple to impose theoretical 
assumptions. There is then, a priori, a consistency between the theoretical and empirical parts of 
the methodology. The COLS methodology used, does not force the distance function to satisfy 
null-jointness and monotonicity. In consequence certain observations violate these assumptions.   15
as a share of GDP,  2 ζ , indicates that countries with relatively large energy 
intensive manufacturing industries was punished with heavier burdens, which is not 
in favour of equity. The Industry energy intensity coefficient,  3 ζ , is insignificant in 
the COLS specification, and significantly positive in the LP specification, 
indicating that countries with relatively larger energy use in the energy intense 
industry were assigned easier emission requirements, which works against equity. 
The coefficients,  6 4 ζ ζ − , for the fuel mix indicators, i.e., Oil share, Electricity 
share  and Renewable  share, work in favour of equity. Finally, the negative 
coefficient of Population,  8 ζ , indicates that countries with larger population were 
given heavier burdens, which do not support equity . 
Regarding the additional variables, the positive coefficient for Forest land,  1 ρ , 
indicates that countries with wide forest areas were assigned lighter environmental 
burdens, recognizing the carbon sink function. Furthermore,, the Car age 
coefficient,  2 ρ , indicates that countries with comparatively old cars were 
considered able to make larger emission reductions.
30  
The directional vector plays a role in determining shadow prices for interior 
output bundles of the output possibilities set,  ) (x P , in (1). As in Färe et al. (2005) 
projections to the technological frontier are made in a direction that increases good 
output and decreases bad output. A direction which would keep bad output constant 
and increasing good output, which corresponds to the directional vector,  ) 0 , 1 ( = g , 
would be expected to lead to lower shadow prices of bad output. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that our conclusions from evaluating the BSA do not hold. To 
check whether these conclusions are sensitive to direction of projecting inferior 
output bundles to the frontier, the procedure in (9) is also accomplished given that 
                                                 
30 If multicollinearity is present the estimates may be afflicted with uncertainty, reflected by lower t-
values due to larger variances. Then, even if the OLS estimator is unbiased, large variance may 
result in parameter estimates showing the wrong sign. To reduce multicollinearity, and to check 
whether it influenced the conclusions, a reduced model was estimated excluding Oil share and 
Electricity share. This means that each circumstance that the Triptych study considered important 
for equity was approximated with one single variable. In the reduced model, t-values for 6 out of 9 
parameter estimates become larger and no estimate alters sign. Therefore, the conclusion drawn 
from the original model, that efficiency did not rule out equity is strenghtened (the reduced model 
results can be obtained from the authors on request).  16
the distance function in (1) is estimated conditional on  ) 0 , 1 ( = g , using linear 




6.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper provides an analysis of the European Union (EU) greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) policy. The Climate Convention was signed in 1992, with the objective to 
stabilize concentration of GHGs. Explicit objectives and measures to be taken were 
settled in Kyoto, resulting in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. 
Under the Protocol, EU committed itself to reducing the emission of 6 GHGs by 8 
percent during 2008-2012, in comparison with the 1990 level. It was further agreed 
that EU could redistribute the assigned GHGs reduction target among the member 
states. The Climate Convention gave no clear guidelines on how to accomplish the 
redistribution, but emphasized the importance of equity and cost-efficiency. Which 
national circumstances that should be considered were much discussed. The 
Triptych study (Phylipsen et al., 1998) served as an advisory document and 
suggested that emissions are ‘equitably’ redistributed if national circumstances such 
as population size and growth, standard of living, economic structure, energy 
efficiency in power generation, and climate are taken into account. However, how 
to actually redistribute GHG emission changes was agreed politically among the 
EU Member States in 1998, and is referred to as the Burden-Sharing Agreement 
(BSA). It resulted in a differentiation of the EU GHGs emission reduction target, 
where half of the member states reduce their emissions while the rest stabilize, or 
even are allowed to increase, emissions. The BSA was reaffirmed by joint 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, where it became binding international 
law. In light of these facts, the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the BSA 
from both an economical and a political perspective performing hypothesis tests of 
whether cost-efficiency and equity were considered in the BSA settlements. 
Variables used to perform the equity tests are chosen on the basis of the 
Triptych study and are readily available. However, the marginal abatement cost 
                                                 
31 The only coefficient that alters sign is the one for industry energy intensity. These results can be 
obtained from the authors on request.  17
(MAC) variable, used to test the cost-efficiency hypothesis, must be computed. As 
a first step, aggregate production data are used to compute MACs for each of the 15 
EU Member States in each year of the period 1990-2000. A shadow-pricing model 
approach, suggested by Färe et al. (2002, 2005), which includes estimation of the 
directional output distance function, is adopted for that purpose. In a second step, 
the hypothesis tests are made possible by regressing the BSA emission change 
figures on the MAC and equity variables, together with other variables that 
potentially had an influence on the BSA. 
A general conclusion drawn is that efficiency did not rule out equity, and vice 
versa, when settling the BSA. The results show that efficiency arguments had an 
influence on burden-sharing. EU Member States with higher MACs of GHGs were 
assigned easier emission change requirements compared to states with lower 
MACs. Also equity arguments were important in the settlement. The results show 
that countries with lower standard of living, in terms of consumption, were assigned 
easier emission change requirements.   18
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Table 1 Greenhouse gas (CO2+CH4+N2O) emissions in the EU 
 











in Mt eq CO2 
Austria  1.7 74  -13.0  64 
Belgium  3.2 139  -7.5 129 
Denmark  1.7 72  -21.0  57 
Finland  1.7 73  0.0 73 
France  14.7 637 0.0  637 
Germany  27.7 1201  -21.0 949 
Greece  2.4 104  25.0  130 
Ireland  1.3 57  13.0  64 
Italy  12.5 542 -6.5 506 
Luxembourg  0.3 14  -28.0  10 
Netherlands  4.8 208  -6.0 196 
Portugal  1.6 69  27.0  87 
Spain  7.0 301  15.0  347 
Sweden  1.6 69  4.0 72 
U.K.  17.9 775  -12.5 678 
Total EU  100.0 4334 -8.0  3998 
*Emission limits for each Member State with the aim of ensuring that the EU meets its overall 8 
percent reduction commitment under the Protocol. The limits are expressed in terms of percentages 
by which Member States must reduce, or in some cases may hold or increase, their emission 
compared with the base year level (1990). Source: Annex 1 of Commission of the European 
Communities (1999) 230 final of 19.05.1999. 
  24
Table 2 Descriptive statistics per year for variables in the output distance function;  
mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
 
Variable  Year 
y1  b1  x1 x 2 x 3 
























































































































Min  7.67 6.58 46.77 0.30 16.58 
Max  43.45 31.35 385.15  0.52  88.69 
 
y1 = GDP, 1000 Euro (1995 constant price) per capita 
b1 = GHGs, tons per capita 
x1 = energy consumption, GJ per capita 
x2 = labor, number of workers per capita 
x3 = capital, 1000 Euro (1995 constant price) per capita  25
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for variables in the output distance function;  
mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
 
Variable  Country 
y1  b1  x1 x 2 x 3 























































































































































y1 = GDP, 1000 Euro (1995 constant price) per capita 
b1 = GHGs, tons per capita 
x1 = energy consumption, GJ per capita 
x2 = labor, number of workers per capita 
x3 = capital, 1000 Euro (1995 constant price) per capita  26
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for variables explaining burden-sharing; mean and 
standard deviations (in parentheses), c1 to c10 defined at end of table 
 
Variable  Country 
c1  c2 c 3 c 4  c5  c6 






















































































































































Table 4 (continued) 
 
Variable  Country 
c7 c 8 c 9  c10 
Austria  -2.98 8.06 
(0.02) 
3.88 6.60 
Belgium  0.32 10.11 
(0.08) 
0.62 5.30 
Denmark  -1.78 5.22 
(0.07) 
0.42 8.20 
Finland  -7.58 5.09 
(0.06) 
23.00 8.60 
France  1.42 59.17 
(0.70) 
16.87 6.60 
Germany  -0.88 81.62 
(0.53) 
10.74 6.60 
Greece  6.12 10.40 
(0.12) 
6.51 8.30 
Ireland  0.02 3.61 
(0.08) 
0.61 6.80 
Italy  4.12 57.39 
(0.22) 
9.86 7.90 
Luxembourg  -0.58 0.41 
(0.02) 
0.09 3.70 
Netherlands  -0.08 15.40 
(0.28) 
0.38 6.40 
Portugal  5.82 9.92 
(0.04) 
3.24 9.90 
Spain  4.02 39.19 
(0.24) 
25.98 8.50 
Sweden  -7.18 8.76 
(0.11) 
28.01 9.00 







List of variables in Table 4 
Standard of living characteristic 
c1 = Consumption expenditure (per household in 1000 Euro for 1994) 
 
Economic structure characteristic 
c2 = Industry gross-value added as a share of GDP  
 
Energy efficiency characteristic 
c3 = Industry energy intensity (industry’s final energy consumption divided by  
industry gross-value-added; in GJ per billions of Euro) 
 
Fuel mix characteristics 
c4 = Oil share (share of crude oil and petroleum consumption in final energy  
consumption) 
c5 = Electricity share (share of electricity consumption in final energy  
consumption) 




c7 = Temperature (deviation of average temperature from the EU average  
temperature for the period 1964-1990) 
 
Population size characteristic 
c8 = Population (in millions of inhabitants) 
 
Additional characteristics 
c9 = Forest land (in millions of ha wooded area in 1995) 
c10 = Car age (average age of total number of cars) 
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Table 5 Parameter estimates of output distance functions estimated on mean  
normalized variables 




α0 intercept  1.79 (6.65)*  1.77 
α1 x 1  -1.09 (-3.67)*  -0.50 
α2 x 2  0.53 (1.10)  -0.02 
α3 x 3  -0.95 (-2.56)*  -0.43 
β1 y 1  -1.11 (-4.37)*  -1.54 
γ1=β1+1 b1  -0.11 (-0.42)  -0.54 
α11 x 1x1  0.20 (1.10)  -0.04 
α12 x 1x2  -0.13 (-0.55)  0.09 
α13 x 1x3  1.33 (7.69)*  0.66 
δ11 x 1y1  -0.23 (-1.69)  -0.10 
η11=δ11 x 1b1  -0.23 (-1.69)  -0.10 
α22 x 2x2  -0.92 (-1.70)  -0.90 
α23 x 2x3  -0.56 (-1.60)  -0.42 
δ21 x 2y1  0.85 (4.95)*  0.80 
η21=δ21 x 2b1  0.85 (4.95)*  0.80 
α33 x 3x3  0.88 (3.11)*  -0.05 
δ31 x 3y1  -0.54 (-2.81)*  0.12 
η31=δ31 x 3b1  -0.54 (-2.81)*  0.12 
β11 y 1y1  0.14 (1.05)  -0.02 
µ11=β11 y 1b1  0.14 (1.05)  -0.02 
γ11=β11 b 1b1  0.14 (1.05)  -0.02 
κ2  Belgium  -0.12 (-3.09)*  -0.11 
κ3 Denmark  0.05 (1.29)  -0.04 
κ4 Spain  -0.72 (-9.79)*  -0.53 
κ5 Finland  -0.25 (-5.13)*  -0.27 
κ6 France  -0.08 (-2.54)*  -0.07 
κ7 U.K.  -0.61 (-10.30)*  -0.41 
κ8 Germany  0.04 (1.51)  -0.07 
κ9 Greece  -0.87 (-12.63)*  -0.66 
κ10 Ireland  -0.64 (-8.60)*  -0.41 
κ11 Italy -0.45 (-8.55)*  -0.33 
κ12 Luxembourg  0.53 (4.69)*  0.52 
κ13 Netherlands  -0.20 (-10.28)*  -0.22 
κ14 Portugal  -1.21 (-9.39)*  -0.73 
κ15 Sweden  -0.09 (-1.85)  -0.05 
τ2  1991  0.01 (1.59)  -0.01 
τ3  1992  0.03 (3.24)*  -0.002 
τ4  1993  0.04 (4.21)*  -0.005 
τ5  1994  0.07 (6.32)*  0.02 
τ6  1995  0.09 (7.59)*  0.03 
τ7  1996  0.10 (7.50)*  0.04 
τ8  1997  0.14 (9.47)*  0.06 
τ9  1998  0.17 (10.45)*  0.09 
τ10  1999  0.19 (11.02)*  0.11 
τ11  2000  0.23 (11.77)*  0.15 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99  
Number of observations  156 156 
* Denotes significance at 5% level.  
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Table 6 Technical output efficiency scores, and potential output changes in 
percentage (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 





% / cap 
∆GHG 





% / cap 
∆GHG 
% / cap 
Austria  0.06 (0.01)  4.88  -7.59  0.02 (0.01)  1.63  -2.53 
Belgium  0.06 (0.02)  5.42  -5.02  0.02 (0.02)  1.81  -1.68 
Denmark  0.06 (0.03)  4.33  -5.07  0.05 (0.04)  3.61  -4.22 
Finland  0.06 (0.02)  5.58  -5.00  0.03 (0.02)  2.79  -2.50 
France  0.06 (0.01)  5.63  -7.98  0.01 (0.01)  0.94  -1.33 
Germany  0.06 (0.01)  4.90  -5.76  0.01 (0.01)  0.82  -0.96 
Greece  0.06 (0.02)  12.89  -6.82  0.02 (0.02)  4.30  -2.27 
Ireland  0.06 (0.02)  7.62  -4.61  0.04 (0.04)  5.08  -3.07 
Italy  0.06 (0.02)  7.67  -8.14  0.02 (0.02)  2.56  -2.71 
Luxembourg  0.06 (0.02)  3.25  -3.41  0.03 (0.03)  1.62  -1.70 
Netherlands  0.06 (0.03)  5.45  -5.19  0.02 (0.02)  1.82  -1.73 
Portugal  0.06 (0.02)  13.30  -10.08  0.01 (0.01)  2.22  -1.68 
Spain  0.06 (0.02)  9.77  -9.11  0.01 (0.02)  1.63  -1.52 
Sweden  0.06 (0.01)  5.25  -9.14  0.02 (0.01)  1.75  -3.05 
U.K.  0.06 (0.02)  7.68  -6.27  0.02 (0.02)  2.56  -2.09 
Average  0.06 (0.02)  6.00  -6.00  0.02 (0.02)  2.00  -2.00 




Table 7 MACs (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Country MAC  (COLS) 
Price of 1 ton GHGs in GDP  
(1000 Euro) 
MAC (LP) 
Price of 1 ton GHGs in GDP  
(1000 Euro) 
Austria  0.27 (0.09)  0.94 (0.04) 
Belgium  0.31 (0.05)  0.28 (0.05) 
Denmark  0.59 (0.05)  1.36 (0.10) 
Finland  0.20 (0.13)  0.56 (0.19) 
France  0.22 (0.06)  0.39 (0.03) 
Germany  0.15 (0.09)  0.87 (0.05) 
Greece  0.71 (0.05)  0.34 (0.03) 
Ireland  0.80 (0.26)  0.29 (0.19) 
Italy  0.37 (0.03)  0.29 (0.02) 
Luxembourg  0.04 (0.05)  0.06 (0.05) 
Netherlands  0.49 (0.07)  0.79 (0.18) 
Portugal  3.32 (0.37)  0.79 (0.09) 
Spain  0.56 (0.09)  0.14 (0.07) 
Sweden  0.43 (0.17)  0.80 (0.23) 
U.K.  1.25 (0.12)  0.71 (0.07) 
Average  0.67 (0.80)  0.57 (0.36) 





Table 8 Analysis of the BSA (t-values within parentheses) 
 
Estimate (t-value)  Coefficient Variable 
COLS LP 
φ Intercept  71.44 (10.85)*  62.17 (10.00)* 
ω  MAC for GHGs  4.08 (5.68)*  10.98 (3.69)* 
ζ1 Consumption  expenditure  -1.71 (-29.78)*  -1.84 (-25.62)* 
ζ2  Industry gross value added, 
as a share of GDP  
-75.90 (-7.31)*  -28.23 (-3.29)* 
ζ3 Industry  energy  intensity  -0.04 (-0.93)  0.19 (3.62)* 
ζ4 Oil  share  -17.52 (-4.80)*  -13.04 (-3.33)* 
ζ5 Electricity  share  71.26 (6.12)*  89.03 (6.32)* 
ζ6  Renewable share  86.19 (15.93)*  100.28 (13.45)* 
ζ7 Temperature  2.67 (17.62)*  3.45 (19.55)* 
ζ8  Population  -0.21 (-15.54)*  -0.23 (-15.10)* 
ρ1  Forest land  0.69 (14.22)*  0.72 (10.66)* 
ρ2 Car  age  -4.79 (-15.00)*  -5.99 (-9.97)* 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99 0.99 
Number of observations  131 131 
* Denotes significance at 5% level. Due to lack of data, the number of observations is now less. 
Ireland lacked data on gross-value added for the industry and is, therefore, excluded from the 
estimations. In addition, other countries lacked data on other variables for certain years. For 
instance, there is no observation on Road freight transport for the year 2000. Therefore, the BSA 






As in Färe et al. (2005) the parametric estimation of the quadratic directional 
output distance function in (4) is first performed by following Aigner and Chu 
(1968). Specifically, by assuming the directional vector  ) 1 , 1 (
1 1 − = − = = b y g g g  the 
parameters in (4) are chosen to 
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To ensure that the functional form of the distance function in (4) satisfies desirable 
properties, the minimization problem in (A1) is solved subject to restrictions (i) – 
(vii). The restrictions in (i) constrain each producer to operate on, or below, the 
technological frontier. The null-jointness property is imposed by the restrictions in 
(ii). This means that, for  0 > y , the output bundle  ) 0 , (y  is not technically feasible, 
which then formally can be stated as  ) ( ) 0 , ( x P y ∉  if and only if  0 ) ; 0 , , ( < g y x D .  34
Monotonicity in outputs is imposed by the restrictions in (iii) and (iv), which 
ensures the correct sign of the shadow prices to be calculated. Monotonicity in 
inputs is imposed by the restrictions in (v). To confine the number of constraints 
this is done at the mean level of data. The translation property in (2) is ensured by 
the restrictions in (vi) and, finally, the restrictions in (vii) impose symmetry. 
 
Corrected Ordinary Least Squares  
Following Färe et al. (2005) the parametric estimation of the quadratic 
directional output distance function in (4) is also performed using Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares (COLS). The translation property in (2) can in our case be 
rewritten as  
 
) , , , , ( ) ; , , , , ( 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 b y x x x D g g b g y x x x D b y = + ⋅ − ⋅ + α α α , (A2)   
 
where 0 ) ; , , , , ( 1 1 3 2 1 ≥ g b y x x x D , and  1
1 = y g  and  1
1 − = − b g . Hence,  
 
α α α − ≥ − + ) ; , , , , ( 1 1 3 2 1 g b y x x x D , (A3) 
 
Letting  1 b = α , and introducing random variation, ε , gives 
 
ε + + = − ) ; , , , ( 1 1 3 2 1 1 g b y x x x D b , (A4) 
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which can be estimated by OLS. The resulting estimator can be used to obtain 
technical efficiency scores. By adding  ) ˆ ( 1
kt kt b ε −  to both sides of the equality in 
(A5) and “correcting” the intercept by adding the largest residual,  ) max(ε , we get 
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 (A6) 
 
which is the expression to be differentiated when calculating shadow prices of 
outputs. The correction of the intercept results in the technical efficiency estimate 
) (⋅
∧
CD , which is nonnegative, corresponding to restrictions (i) in the optimization 




CD .  
 
                                                 
32 Regarding the COLS estimator, see, e.g., Greene (1993). 